This paper studies the effects of and countermeasures against adversarial behavior in network resource allocation mechanisms such as pricing and auctions. It models the heterogeneous behavior of users, which ranges from altruistic to selfish and even to malicious, using game theory. The paper adopts a mechanism design approach to quantify the effect of adversarial behavior and modify the mechanisms to respond. First, the Price of Malice of the existing network mechanisms to adversarial behavior, which ranges from extreme selfishness to destructive maliciousness, is analyzed. Then, two methods are discussed to counter such adversarial behavior: one is a differentiated pricing to punish the malicious users and another is a detection method based on the expected utility functions of the "regular" users on the network. Finally, the results obtained are illustrated with multiple examples and numerical simulations.
INTRODUCTION
The behavior of different users (players) on networks may range from altruistic on the one end to malicious (adversarial) on the other end of a wide spectrum (see Figure1) . While altruistic users aim to improve the overall network performance, a selfish player strategise to maximize her throughput by getting the proportional share of resources. A malicious user, however, tries to get a disproportionate share of network resource, and in addition may disrupt the whole network. Well-known examples of this adversarial behavior in networks include jamming in wireless networks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [1] - [2] .
In this paper, we model the coexistence of altruistic, selfish and malicious players using a noncooperative game theoretic formulation and adopt a mechanism design approach. Here, we assume that malicious users mainly stay within the rules of of the system but exhibit adversarial behavior. We model them by assigning different utility functions than selfish players, such as own selfish utility minus the sum of utility of other users in the system or a convex one in contrast to the usually concave utility functions of selfish users. Thus, we map their destructive behavior such as jamming other players and launching Denial-of-Service(DoS) attacks to rational incentives.
To analyze the effects of adversarial behavior, we quantify the robustness of some known network mechanisms with respect to the adversarial behavior of (some of) their participants. A modified version the metric called Price of Malice [3] - [4] is defined suitable for games in network resource allocation and applied to two different network problems dealt here. In the cases analyzed, the malicious players are assumed to take the maximum resource share possible without detection and that way try to disrupt others.
To counter the adversarial behavior, we design mechanisms in which the prices are varied differentially to punish the malicious players after detecting them using any threshold detection technique based on the bids of users. Clearly, when the malicious users does not abide by the rules and vandalize the system, harder responses such as blocking the malicious users after detection are required. We employ a differentiated pricing scheme in which both aggressively selfish and malicious players with disproportional usage of resources are made to pay higher prices than regular selfish players. The effectiveness of this method is quantified using a specific trade-off metric defined. In addition, we discuss an approach for detecting malicious players using the fact that their utility functions do not belong to the same class of utility functions expected for selfish players. After detection the mechanism designer or other good players can ban or punish these malicious players.
Figure 1: Different behavior of users in networks
We consider two different types of network problems in this paper, which differ in coupling of users, i.e. how their actions affect each other, and resource sharing methods. The first one is rate (congestion) control with additive resource sharing, e.g. sharing of bandwidth at a link with fixed capacity. The second one is interference management, e.g. uplink power control in CDMA wireless networks with interference coupling. While allocating these divisible resources to selfish users, a loss in social welfare is caused at the resulting Nash equilibrium due to the selfish nature often referred as Price of Anarchy. Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing mechanisms are proposed to shift the Nash equilibrium point to efficient point. In these mechanisms and underlying games, the selfish nature of rational users were modeled with concave utility functions. But in practical situations, there are altruistic users who care for the welfare of all the users and adversarial users who may deviate from equilibrium point even if it causes loss to them or will show extreme selfishness, i.e. they behave 'irrationally' if modeled using this class of utility functions. We retain the rationality assumption by associating them with different utility functions. In the presence of the these altruistic and adversarial agents, the mechanisms employed will have Nash equilibrium different from the efficient point and this deviation is captured in the metric Price of Malice. In this paper, Price of Malice is quantified for some specific network mechanisms and these mechanisms are modified to punish the adversarial users to make them come back to regular selfish behavior, which brings the system to the efficient Nash equilibrium point.
Related works
In networked systems with selfish users, a loss in overall social welfare was identified and referred as Price of Anarchy [5, 6] . In the presence of malicious users this concept was extended and Price of Byzantine Anarchy and Price of Malice was first introduced in [3] . They obtained bounds on these metrics which are parameterized by the number of malicious users for a virus inoculation game for social networks. A modified definition was proposed in [4] for congestion games based on the delay experienced at Nash equilibrium point with and without the presence of a malicious player. Both of these works have observed a Windfall of Malice, where malicious behavior actually improves the social welfare of non-oblivious selfish users due to the better cooperation resulting because of the 'fear factor' or effects similar to Braess's paradox [4] . In [7] a more general definition of Price of Malice is given with weaker assumptions than above mentioned works in the presence of Byzantine players and using a no-regret analysis. A game theoretic model for the strategic interaction of legitimate and malicious players is introduced in [8] , where the authors have derived a bound on the damage caused by the malicious players. In [9] , partial altruism of some of the users is analyzed and a bound on Price of Anarchy was obtained as a function of the altruism parameter. To get around with Price of Anarchy, pricing for price taking users [10] [11] [12] and auctions for price anticipating users [13, 14] are employed. In [15] , the effect of spiteful behavior of some of the users is analyzed in the context of first and second price auctions and the revenue obtained is compared. In this paper, we quantify the Price of Malice of the mechanisms proposed for network resource allocation and modify the rules of these mechanisms to counter the malicious behavior.
To counter the adversarial behavior, Micali & Valiant in [16] , have developed a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism, taking into account collusive, irrational, and adversarial behavior for combinatorial auctions. In the proposed mechanism, the price charged to an agent is increased from VCG price by a scaled factor of the maximum social welfare of other agents. In spirit of this, we also modify the pricing in the proportional fair allocation mechanisms to punish the malicious users and incentivise them to come to regular selfish behavior.
The main contributions of this paper include:
1. Quantifying the Price of Malice in various network mechanisms with adversarial users.
2. Design of differentiated pricing scheme to punish adversarial users and definition of a trade-off parameter.
3. Detection of malicious users by comparing their (observed) utility function to those of regular (selfish) users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the underlying mechanism design model. Subsequently, Section 3 quantifies the Price of Malice of the network mechanisms with respect to the adversarial behavior. In Section 4, a differentiated pricing scheme to counter the adversarial behavior is introduced and a method to detect malicious agents is presented. Numerical simulations and their results are shown in Section 5. The paper concludes with remarks of Section 6.
MECHANISM DESIGN AND GAME MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS USERS
At the center of the mechanism design model is the designer D who influences N users, denoted by the set A, and participating in a strategic (noncooperative) game. These players are autonomous and rational decision makers, who share and compete for limited resources of the network under the given constraints of the environment. Let us define an N -player strategic game, G, where each player i ∈ A has a respective decision variable xi such that
where X is the decision space of all players. Let
be the profile of decision variable of players other than i th player and X−i is the respective decision space. As a starting point, this paper assumes scalar decision variables and a compact and convex decision space. The decision variables may represent, in network resource allocation problems, player flow rate, power level or Signal to Interference Ratio (SINR). Due to the inherent coupling between the players, the decisions of players directly affect each other's performance as well as the aggregate allocation of limited resources.
The preferences of the players are captured by utility functions
which are chosen to be continuous and differentiable for analytical tractability. In this paper, the selfishness nature of users are captured by continuous and differentiable concave utility functions.
We consider here a mechanism design having heterogeneous users in the induced game, in which one subset of users have 'abnormal' utility function compared to the class of regular selfish users. The utility function of the class of malicious users can be very different depending on their nature and goals. The disrupting nature of malicious users where they want to create loss to other users even at the cost of their benefit and the altruistic nature of some users who want to care for the social welfare can be captured with a modified utility function. One such modified utility function can be obtained by a convex combination of user utilities
where θi is the parameter between -1 and 1 which captures the range of behavior of a user given in Figure 1 . This utility function can be modified by taking the average of the utilities of all the users in the second term [9] . The table below lists the values of θ and corresponding user behavior.
Let us define the set of selfish users be S ⊂ A. Also, the set of malicious and altruistic users, i.e. users with θi = 0 is defined as B and B = A\S. When the set B has only malicious users, the utility function of malicious users can be modified as
The extreme selfishness or greedy nature of malicious users can be also captured with a convex utility function. In this case they will take the maximum possible share of the resource constrained above by either physical limits or a level that leads to immediate detection.
The designer D devises a mechanism M , which can be represented by the mapping M : X → R N , implemented by introducing incentives in the form of rules and prices to players. The latter can be formulated by adding it as a cost term such that the player i has the quasi-linear cost function
where ci(x) is the price payed by i th user to the mechanism.
We differentiate between two kinds of mechanisms, auctions and pricing, which differ in the assumption on nature of the users and the interaction rules. In auction mechanisms, the designer D imposes on a player i ∈ A a user-specific
• resource allocation rule, Qi(x),
• resource pricing, ci(x),
based on their bids x. The price anticipating users decide on their bid, minimizing their individual cost.
In pricing mechanisms, the price taking users decide on their allocation as best response to the user specific price Pi induced by the designer and there is no explicit allocation rule dictated by the designer. In this case, the cost function is
Similar to player preferences, the designer objective, e.g. maximization of aggregate user utilities or social welfare, can be formulated using a smooth objective function V for the designer:
where ci(x) and Ui(x), i = 1, . . . , N are user-specific pricing terms and player utilities, respectively. Hence, the global optimization problem of the designer is simply maxx V (x, Ui(x), ci(x)), which it solves indirectly by setting rules and prices. The different properties of mechanisms analyzed in this paper are attached in the appendix.
In this paper, for tractability purposes, we model user i's utility function as logarithmic, parameterized by her private value αi. In this case, the aim of the designer in the auction setting will be to make the users report their true private value, i.e, xi = αi and carry out an efficient allocation based on that.
The players share and compete for limited resources in the given environment under its information and communication constraints. We focus on two basic types of resource sharing and coupling, which are often encountered in a variety of problems in networking:
1. Additive resource sharing: the players share a finite resource C such that
This type of coupling is encountered in bandwidth sharing and rate control in networks.
2.
Interference coupling (linear interference): the resource allocated to player i, γi, is inversely proportional to interference generated others such that
where hi ∀i and σ denote some system parameters. Interference coupling occurs in wireless networks where γ represents signal-to-interference ratio.
We assume that the malicious users have information about the utility function of other selfish users but the regular selfish users do not have the information about the existence of malicious users and their identities. We consider the case where the selfish users cannot collaborate, detect and punish malicious users themselves since it will require a lot of common information and communication for coordination. Therefore, we use a designer who anticipates and detects malicious behavior of any user and modifies the pricing appropriately to counter the malicious behavior. In the next sections, the effect of malicious users to system social welfare is quantified and some counter measures are proposed.
PRICE OF MALICE IN MECHANISMS
In this section, we quantify the robustness of mechanisms described in the above setting, against malicious players. For this purpose, we first redefine the metric Price of Malice (P oM (M )) of mechanism M suitable for mechanisms in resource sharing setting. A similar metric called Price of Byzantine Anarchy is used in [3] to quantify the social welfare loss at Nash equilibrium point in the presence of malicious users compared to the optimal point, but in a virus inoculation game scenario. For congestion games with malicious flow concentrated on one malicious player Price of Malice was redefined, based on the delay experienced at Nash equilibrium point with and without the malicious player in [4] .
The metric Price of Malice of a mechanism M is defined as:
where Q is the allocation at the Nash equilibrium when none of the users are malicious and Q ′ is the allocation at the Nash equilibrium in the presence of malicious users.
Now, we estimate the value of Price of Malice parameter for two networks which differ in user coupling and resource sharing as described in the previous section.
Price of Malice in Auction Mechanisms
We present auction mechanisms [17] for two network coupling schemes, rate control in wired networks and power allocation in interference coupled wireless networks, and quantify the Price of Malice for both cases. The adversarial behavior considered in this section is that the malicious players take maximum possible share of the resources and hence try to disrupt others by denying them their fair share of resources.
Additive Sharing (Rate Control in Networks)
We consider the rate sharing problem with users having separable utility in networks and quantify the effect of the adversarial behavior on it. Let users with utilities Ui(Qi) = αi log Qi(x) share a fixed bandwidth C such that N i=1 Qi(x) = C, where xi ∈ (0, xmax). The vector x in this case denotes player flow rates and Q the capacity allocated to them [19, 20] . Consider the utility function given in (2) and the cost of i th user is given by,
The designer solves the constrained optimization problem
in order to find a globally optimal allocation Q that satisfies this efficiency criterion. The associated Lagrangian function is then
where λ > 0 is a scalar Lagrange multiplier. Under the convexity assumptions made, this leads to
and the efficiency constraint
and Qi = 0 for users with U ′ i (Qi) < λ.
Let the designer employ the total payment to i th user as the one obtained in [14] assuming all the users are just selfish in an efficient auction mechanism Ma with proportional allocation which is defined based on the bid of player i,
The total payment of i th user is
as given by [14] .
Using this payment function the best response of user having the modified utility function becomes
We can observe that malicious users having −1 ≤ θ < 0, will report xi > αi and altruistic users having 0 < θ ≤ 1, will report xi < αi.
The allocation for the regular selfish users, i.e., users with θi = 0 in the presence of altruistic or malicious users can be written as
.
Let
For this additive resource sharing case, the Price of Malicious P oM (Ma) is
For the case where users are symmetric αi = α, ∀i, and only one user is malicious or all the malicious user coordinate to form one entity, this simplifies to
From the above equations, the Price of Malice of the mechanism can be obtained knowing system parameters and user preferences and can be bounded above and below depending on the range and distribution of these values for the specific setting. Note that for the system with altruistic users and selfish users P oM will be negative, which can be clearly observed from the equation for symmetric case above, which means that the altruistic users are improving social welfare of other selfish users by taking lesser share of resource. In the case of malicious users, as θ decreases from 0 to −1, we can see that the P oM (Ma) increases. We can also observe that when both malicious and altruistic users are present along with selfish ones, their effect on PoM depends on the number and degree of value of θ. If they are of same number and degree,i.e., if |θi| = |θj| for i = j, then their effect on PoM cancel each other. The variation of values of P oM (Ma) for different values of θ is given in the simulation section.
Interference Coupled Systems (CDMA Power Control)
Consider an auction mechanism in the context of a wireless network and uplink power control setting ( [18, 21] ) where due to the interference coupling the resource sharing is inherently competitive. Let the user utilities be defined as Ui(x) = αi log γi(Q(x)) and the individual power levels, Q, satisfy N i=1 Qi ≤ C, where the signal-to-interference ratio (SINR) received by the base station is
and xi ∈ (0, xmax).
An auction-based mechanism, M b , can be defined based on the bid of player i, with the resource allocation rule
which is proportional allocation as first analyzed in [14] . We can see that using this proportional allocation, full utilization of resource is attained, i.e. i Qi = C. Now we decouple the user utilities by rewriting γi as
using the full utilization property. For the allocation given in (10), the SINR is
In [18] , it is observed that in systems with sufficiently high SINR assumption Ui(x) = αi log γi(Qi(x)) is concave in Qi, where γi(Qi) is given by (11) .A pricing mechanism given in [14] will make the selfish users to report xi = αi.
In the presence of malicious and altruistic users the SINR obtained by the regular users will be,
Then, we obtain P oM (M b ) as
In the symmetric case and only one user is malicious, the PoM becomes
A similar behavior of P oM (M b ) as in the case of additive sharing can be observed for different values of θ. The variation of P oM (M b ) for different values of θ is given in the simulation section for a specific set of parameters.
Price of Malice in Pricing Mechanisms
A counterpart of the Price of Malice metric in Definition 1 for pricing mechanisms [10] , which differ from auctions by their lack of an explicit resource allocation scheme, can be obtained by replacing Q(x) and Q ′ (x) with the action vector without malicious users x and with malicious users x ′ , respectively.
In the case of additive resource sharing, the users with utilities Ui(xi) = αi log xi share the fixed resource N i=1 xi = C, and xi ∈ (0, xmax). Consider an efficient mechanism Mc, which can be implemented in an iterative way. The efficient allocation is
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. In the case of all selfish users λ = i αi/C and it will be set as price to the users.
Let each malicious user take a share xm which can be xmax, the maximum share they can use without detection, according to their utility function, in order to disrupt others. Let λ ′ be the Lagrange multiplier in this case which will be a different point than λ = i αi/C. The remaining resource (C − B xm) will be shared among good users, under the efficient mechanism Mc. In the additive sharing case P oM (Mc) is,
For symmetric case, where αi = α ∀i, it becomes
The counterpart of auction in the interference-coupled case for pricing can be obtained in a similar way and the mechanism can be denoted as M d . The variation of values of P oM (Mc) and P oM (M d ) for different number of users is given and compared with each other in the simulation section.
RESPONSE MECHANISMS TO MALICIOUS USERS
The robustness analyses in the previous sections only measure the effect of selfish and malicious users but does not provide a way to encounter them. In this section, we consider two possible response schemes to adversarial behavior: one based on softer punishment scheme using differentiated pricing and the other relying on detection of malicious users observing their utility function. The latter has to be supported by a separate punishment mechanism which should follow the detection phase.
Differentiated Pricing
We consider a softer response scheme than blocking towards malicious users after explicit detection based on any well known (threshold) detection scheme. The response mechanism is implemented by the designer by deploying a differentiated pricing. First, we define a trade-off metric T (M ) for quantifying the effectiveness of a pricing-based response to a mechanism M . This metric provides a way to measure the trade-off between the damage due to malicious users and how much effort (price) it costs them to create this damage.
DEFINITION 2.
A metric for quantifying effectiveness of a pricingbased response mechanism against a set of malicious users B ⊂ A is defined as:
, and the lower bound is achieved in the best case scenario of perfect differentiation in terms of pricing.
Now we utilize this metric to evaluate the properties of the differentiated pricing scheme on example networks. A necessary assumption we make in this subsection is that malicious users stay within the system and do not have any means to evade the pricing mechanisms imposed by the designer. This assumption is relaxed in the next subsection.
Auctions for Additive Sharing
We derive now a differentiated payment function to counter the malicious behavior of users. It is assumed here that the designer knows the value of θ of malicious user. In practical problems, this is not realistic and the designer needs to make the decision on payment function entirely based on user bids. Therefore, we assume that after detecting the malicious user using a threshold detection scheme based on the bids, the designer punishes the malicious users with a price function assuming θ = −1, i.e, extreme maliciousness. Alternatively, once can couple this parameter with the confidence of the detection scheme used, i.e. low θ values for high probability of malicious behavior and vice versa. The best response of the i th user who tries to minimize her cost in terms of the signal or bid to be sent is obtained by computing
This condition is necessary and sufficient for optimality. Then,
Let us denote t = j xj, then xi = tQi C and j =i
Doing the substitutions,
When we compare (15) and (5), we can see that f (Qi, t) is equal to the Lagrange multiplier λ. Since f (Qi, t) is a function of Qi, there will be unequal marginal valuations at equilibrium. For efficient allocation we need to obtain a price function which will induce a f (Qi, t) which will give identical marginal valuations at equilibrium [14] . For this we make f (Qi, t) independent of Qi and derive corresponding price function. Let f (Qi, t) = g(t) where g(t) is the generator function and
By integrating over xi, we obtain
For g(t) = t, we obtain
Let us assume that the users except i th user are merely selfish due to the payment function of the mechanism they report xi = αi.
If the designer punishes the users who are detected as malicious with a payment in which θi = −1, then the final pricing function becomes
Now we can define a mechanism Mm which is defined by the allocation rule (7) and pricing rule given by (18) . Note that in this differentiated pricing scheme, the malicious users who will try to bid something higher than its private value will have to pay an additional amount proportional to their bid. The tradeoff-parameter of mechanism Mm is given by, + (N − 1) ) .
Such a differentiated pricing scheme is widely used today in various settings, such as network access. For example, if some users of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) are creating burden to the network by using much higher amount of resources above a predetermined cap, they are priced differentially higher compared to other users. This reality is captured in our model since the higher usage above a threshold is punished even if it is not coming from the disproportionate use due to malicious nature.
In a similar way, a differentiated pricing mechanism can be also derived for interference coupled CDMA systems.
Pricing Mechanism for Additive Sharing
Let us consider the counterpart of pricing mechanism in additive sharing given in the previous section and study the effect of the differentiated pricing in that case. As one possibility we model the utility function of a malicious player as Ui(xi) = e β i x i , which reflects aggressive behavior in terms of resource demand. Note that this is still private information unknown to the designer. As a result, A malicious user takes a share of xm ∈ (x + ǫ, xmax), where x is the mean and ǫ is some integer multiple of standard deviation of the demand vector x.
In order to counter the malicious behavior, the designer deploys differentiated pricing as part of a new mechanism Me, which is a modified version of Mc. It is characterized by the pricing function
where b is determined by a statistical method, for example b = x + kσx, where x is the mean and σx is standard deviation and Pi is the pricing function in the original mechanism. The function f (.) is selected suitably depending on the utility functions of selfish and malicious users. If it is assumed that selfish users have continuous and differentiable concave utility function and malicious users have convex utility functions, then f (.) can be a continuous and differentiable convex function. For the logarithmic utility function assumed here for selfish users, we take f (.) as exponential function. The value of b can be obtained alternatively from a clustering method or another Maximum-likelihood algorithm. Note that, the designer punishes the malicious players by employing a price function which increases exponentially with the share of resource taken by them, i.e. if they deviate too much from the mean behavior and create a significant burden on the system.
For the case of exponential pricing function, T (Me) is obtained as,
In the symmetric and only one malicious user case, it becomes
Pricing Mechanism for Interference Coupled Systems
Consider the case of pricing in interference coupled systems given in Section 3. To counter the malicious behavior, the designer introduces a new mechanism M f which employs the differentiated pricing given by
In the case of logarithmic utility, Pi = λ + j =i αj Ij , where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the associated optimization problem and Ii := j =i xj + σ is the interference affecting player i [11, 12] . For the mechanism M f , the trade-off metric T (M f ) can be obtained in similar way as for additive sharing case. The variation of values of T (Me) and T (M f ) for different number of users is given and compared with each other in the simulation section.
Malicious User Detection based on Utility Functions
It is not realistic in some scenarios to assume that the malicious users follow the rules of the mechanism. Therefore, it will not be possible to handle them by modifying the rules of the mechanism as done in the differentiated pricing case. In this section, we discuss one detection technique which can be used in addition to the classical techniques developed so far. All of the mechanisms discussed in this paper provide a way for the designer to infer the utility function of the users through the observations. The aggressive or malicious user behavior can be captured using utility functions that fundamentally differ from those of regular users. Let us assume that the designer expects that utility functions of the regular users belong to a certain class such as the class of concave functions. Then, if certain users are observed to take a bigger share of resources than the one indicated by the expected class of utility, they can be detected as malicious.
Let us consider the setting given in Section 3 and assume that utility of a malicious player is Ui(xi) = e β i Q i , for some parameter βi. The designer can estimate the value of utility parameter αi of each player i from the share of resource taken Qi. Let Q * i be the intersection of utility function of malicious player and the logarithmic utility function expected from her if she was just a regular selfish player. Then, we obtain
Clearly, the value of αi obtained for a malicious user will be much higher than those of regular users. In other words, this utility parameter does not fit to any possible logarithmic curve. This is taken as an indication of adversarial behavior. Notice that, this detection scheme is more widely applicable than differentiated pricing since it does not require the malicious users abide by the pricing scheme. After detection, the malicious users can be blocked or punished with an additional method.
SIMULATIONS
In this section, computer simulation results are presented to show the different parameters of the proposed mechanisms. First, the Price of Malice P oM (Ma) and P oM (M b ) of pricing mechanism for additive sharing Ma and interference coupling M b , respectively, using the setup in Section 3 by varying the value of θ from −1 to 0. The number of users N = 50 out of which 10 users are taken to be malicious with same θ value. The other system parameters are C = 30 and σ = 1. The simulations are done by generating the player preferences α's according to a uniform distribution on the support set [0, 10] and plotted in Figure 2 . It can be observed that value of P oM (Ma) and P oM (M b ) decreases as θ varies from -1 to 0 as expected. We next compute the Price of Malice P oM (Mc) and P oM (M d ) for the auction mechanism for additive sharing Mc and interference coupling M d , respectively, using the setup in Example 3 by varying the number of users from 8 to 15. The simulations are done by generating the player preferences α's according to a uniform distribution on the support set [0, 2] and repeated 100 times. Then, the mean and standard deviation of the obtained R(M ) values are plotted in Figure 3 . The number of malicious users is fixed at 3, C = 5, σ = 0.5 and xmax = 1. The malicious users take an allocation xmax and remaining share is allocated using respective iterative algorithms among good users. The quantities P oM (Mc) and P oM (M d ) are plotted in Figure 3 . It can be observed that, for a fixed number of malicious users, as number of users increases the mechanisms become more robust, as expected. Next, the trade-off parameter T (M ) is plotted for auction mechanism Mm for additive sharing for different values of θ in Figure 4 . The users having x > x + 2 σx are priced differentially as described in Section 4. Finally, the trade-off parameter T (M ) is plotted for pricing mechanisms Me and M f in Figure 5 . An iterative algorithm as given in [12] is used to obtain allocation and prices. The other parame-ters remain the same as those used to generate the Figure 3 . It can be seen from Figure 5 that mechanism M f performs better than Me in this case, possibly due to the coupling involved. 
CONCLUSION
We have studied adversarial behavior in network resource allocation schemes including pricing and auctions by adopting a mechanism design approach to measure and counter it. First, we have analyzed the robustness of the existing network mechanisms to adversarial behavior, which ranges from extreme selfishness to destructive maliciousness, using a quantitative metric Price of Malice. Next, we have presented two methods to counter such adversarial behavior: one is a differentiated pricing to punish the aggressive players and another is a detection method based on the expected utility functions of the "regular" users on the network. Finally, the results obtained have been illustrated with multiple examples and numerical simulations.
Future research directions include obtaining bounds on the parameters dealt in this paper and a study of collusion and related tradeoffs, as well as behavioral detection schemes. It is also an interesting direction to analyze the effect of altruism or partial altruism of some of the users in this context, as in the work [9] .
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